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Offshore Banking Facilities as a Conduit
for Foreign Investment: Problems,
Implications and Projections
I. Introduction
The fundamental and irreversible changes that have occurred in
world-wide economics are graphically illustrated in no better place
than the financial-institution market. At the core of the financial in-
stitution market is an international banking industry composed of
differentiated and competing banking centers. In the past decade,
the free-enterprise orientation of these banking centers has seen a
dramatic increase. Foremost among the reasons for this increase is
the rise in importance of offshore banking facilities.1
Historically, the existence of an offshore banking facility was
predicated upon the physical attributes and advantages of the
center's location.2 These historical advantages, however, have been
undermined dramatically by modern communications and modern
1. Although the definition of an offshore banking facility is nebulous, the term is gen-
erally understood to include the following:
any company organized under the laws of a foreign country or a territory of
the United States which engages in the business of banking outside of the
United States, or any subsidiary, affiliate, or branch facility of a banking com-
pany, organized under the laws of the United States or any state of the United
States, which is located outside of the United States. Comment, International
Banking Facilities, 8 N. CAROLINA J. OF INT'L LAW AND COM. REG. 61, 62
(1982) (note 3).
Furthermore, the growth of these facilities in terms of dollars and branch number is phenome-
nal. Currently, there are 30 recognized offshore facilities. United States domestic bank assets
in only six of these facilities at the end of 1978 totalled $127 billion, compared to only $14
billion in 1972. Blum, Offshore Money Flows, 35 J. OF INT'L. AFF. 69, 72 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Blum]. An unofficial IRS report delineates an overall offshore banking facility growth
of foreign (external market, see infra note 17) assets from $16 billion in 1970 to $289 billion
in 1978. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Unofficial Study Group, Estimates of Levels of Tax
Haven Use, May 1981; see also Blum at 72.
The growth of the number of banks also illustrates the industry's growth. For example,
the Cayman Islands in 1964, had two "local" (see infra note 48) banks and no offshore facili-
ties. Blum at 72. By 1981, however, the Caymans had 360 branch facilities of foreign banks.
Id. Similarly, the Bahamas have displayed a phenomenal growth in offshore facilities, cur-
rently having over 300 banks with a collective portfolio of $85 billion. Id.
2. Historically, offshore banking facilities provided market penetration to world trade,
but were protected from the interference and strife of the mainland. SAMPSON, THE MONEY
LENDERS (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), p. 182, p. 221. Moreover, because of their
commitment to economic and not political pursuits, warring factions in times of disputes
tended to respect the neutrality of these facilities. Id.
transportation.3 Currently, the term "offshore" is less a description
of location than it is a figurative term meaning outside the reach of
regulatory control.' Consequently, offshore banking centers created
in response to the regulatory environment are dependent on that en-
vironment for their continued existence.'
Offshore banks have been, and are tax-havens.6 Tax advantages,
though a large impetus, have not been the sole nor most pervasive
influence in the development of these banking facilities. Greater
macro-economic factors, coupled with the inherent nature of federal
regulation, have created an opportune environment in which regula-
tory-conscious entrepreneurs, in cooperation with financial-business
oriented and income seeking nations, have formed partnerships to at-
tract financial transaction income.7 Primarily, the financial transac-
tion income has involved United States banks with offshore branches
hoping to escape federal regulatory and tax liability." Recent
changes in United States policy, particularly the Federal Reserve
Board's decision to authorize International Banking Facilities, has
threatened to reduce the transaction income of offshore banks, while
simultaneously reducing the influence of foreign banks on the United
States domestic market.9 Consequently, offshore banking facilities
require an increased transaction volume to maintain past income
levels. To take advantage of these recent changes in the Federal Re-
serve Board policy, 10 foreign banks must utilize the amorphous na-
ture11 of the offshore banking facility. The value of the offshore fa-
cility lies primarily in its use as subsidiary through which it may act
as a conduit for foreign investment.
This paper will explore development of the symbiotic relation-
ship between offshore banking facilities and foreign banks as a con-
duit for foreign investment into the United States. the comment be-
gins by delineating the international macro-economic factors and
United States domestic regulations that have encouraged the growth
3. Wise, International Banking Facilities and the Future of Offshore Banking, 6
FLETCHER F. 299, 300 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Wise].
4. Id.
5. id.
6. A tax haven is defined as "a political-financial jurisdiction whose laws and regula-
tory practices provide for banking secrecy and do not tax foreign funds that are held and
administered locally and whose income is derived from sources outside the haven jurisdiction."
Blum, supra note 1, at 70.
7. Financial institution transaction income refers to the revenue generated and derived
by offshore jurisdictions from the minimal taxation of funds filtered through offshore banking
facilities. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
9. See infra not 77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
I1. An offshore bank, because of the regulatory environment in which it survives, tends
to "look like a commercial bank, act like a private bank, and is a politically protected special
bank." Blum, supra note I, at 7.
of offshore banking. Next, it examines the niche fitting regulatory
philosophy of offshore governments. Additionally, recent changes in
United States policy are examined and expounded upon as the pri-
mary reason for foreign banks' utilization of offshore subsidiaries as
conduits for foreign investment and entry into the United States do-
mestic banking market. Furthermore, problems and implications as-
sociated with this utilization are considered. The comment concludes
by offering qualitative and quantitative projections of the future role
of offshore banking as a conduit for foreign investment in the United
States.
II. Background: Factors Giving Rise to Offshore Banking Facility
Development
Two primary groups of factors have created an opportune envi-
ronment for the growth of offshore banking facilities. These groups
can be categorized as international macro-economic factors 2 and do-
mestic United States regulatory factors. 13 The existence of each
group of factors is important not only for a historical analysis of the
offshore banking industry's growth, but also as a hueristic device to
examine foreign banking's entry into the United States domestic
banking market.
A. International Factors
1. External Financial Market Gravitation.-As has been well
documented,' 4 the world banking system exhibits a three-tiered
structure which includes the following:
a) domestic markets;' 5
b) foreign markets as an extension of and attached to domestic
markets; and' 6
c) external markets outside the jurisdiction.' 7
These three tiers of the world banking system exhibit three corre-
12. See infra notes 15 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 35 and accompanying text.
14. Gunter Dufey, International Capital Markets: Structure and Response in an Age
of Instability, SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW, Spring 1981, at 35 [hereinafter cited as Dufeyl;
Wise, International Banking Facilities and the Future of Offshore Banking, 6 FLETCHER F.
299, 301 (1982).
15. The determination of what constitutes a market is strictly predicated upon geo-
graphic and regulatory factors. In the case of a domestic market, national boundaries and
regulating sovereignty establish the market. Wise, supra note 3 at 301.
16. Foreign markets refer to those markets which have regulatory control over the for-
eign banks' activities based upon national sovereignty of a different nation than that in which
the bank is chartered. The foreign market is an integral element of the foreign bank's opera-
tions. There is, however, no conversion of monetary units in the foreign bank's transactions in
the foreign market. Wise, supra note 3, at 301.
17. The external market is located in a different and completely separate political juris-
diction. The market requires the conversion of different monetary units by foreign banks par-
ticipating within the foreign jurisdiction. Wise, supra note 3 at 301.
sponding types of banking transactions: domestic, international and
eurocurrency.18 Offshore banking facilities are involved primarily, if
not exclusively, in foreign market and external market
transactions.19
The external market, which is the principal focus of offshore
banking activities, is composed of two parts: "a market which ac-
cepts deposits from the non-bank public and lends to the non-bank
public, and an interbank market where banks lend and borrow ex-
cess funds.""0 Moreover, the interbank market is the most significant
part of the external currency market, representing approximately
eighty-five percent (85%) of the total market.21
The loan rate structure and bank profit structure of the external
market interbank loan network is affected by two factors: the domes-
tic market rate structure and the liquidity and cost of fund move-
ment between markets.2 While the domestic rate structure is a
fairly definable variable, the liquidity and cost of the movement of
funds from one market to another tends to be subject to a plethora
of non-quantifiable variables. Consequently, external market rates
tend to fluctuate in less predictable patterns than do domestic bank-
ing market rates.
Numerous commentators have concluded that external market
transactions are the product of "escape motivation."23 Escape moti-
vation is a phenomenon "whereby banks seek to escape from a mar-
ket in which there was an effort to set a regulated floor profit into an
unregulated or extremely competitive market." '24 Banks refuse to ac-
cept the minimum regulated rate of profit offered by many domestic
governments in order to escape the regulated ceiling on maximum
profits that is simultaneously imposed.25 Additionally, the difficulty
in regulating minimum profit due to the "close and interconnected
18. Dufey, supra note 14, at 37; Wise, supra note 3, at 301. Domestic transactions
involve transactions between citizens of the same nation. In a domestic transaction, there is no
conversion of currency and the single currency of the nation in which the transaction occurs is
utilized. An international transaction involves residents of two different nations, but the trans-
action currency is the legal tender in the country of deposit. A eurocurrency transaction or
external market transaction is one which utilizes a currency which is not the legal tender in
the country of deposit. Id. Consequently, the key elements to the establishment and identifica-
tion of an external market transaction is the type of currently deposited, not the legal tender in
the situs of the deposit. Id.
19. Id. at 302, see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
20. Wise, International Banking Facilities and the Future of Offshore Banking, 6
FLETCHER F. 299 (1982).
21. H. Wallich, Why the Euromarket Needs Restraint, 14 COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus.
17 (1979).
22. Wise, supra note 3, at 302.
23. Gray and Gray, "The Multinational Bank: A Financial MNC?" J. OF BANKING
AND FINANCE, March 1981, at 48 (as cited in Wise, supra note 3, at 302).
24. Wise, supra note 3 at 302.
25. Id.
nature""6 of the banking system contributes to this "escape motiva-
tion." Thus, as a matter of economic survival, banks seek competi-
tive markets.
A competitive market by implication means a market which is
less regulated.2 7 Therefore, external financial markets tend to gravi-
tate toward an offshore void in regulation.2
The gravitation toward offshore banking is not exclusive to any
jurisdiction, and affects foreign banks as well as domestic United
States banks.29 Therefore, the external market exists as a parallel or
alternative market in competition with domestic markets.
2. Economic Expansion Factors.-The rise of offshore bank-
ing facilities is also a result of the growth, both in volume and veloc-
ity, of international trade and the post-World War II international
dependency on the dollar as the major international reserve cur-
rency."0 Subsequent to World War II, deficit spending by the United
States further encouraged the rise of the external market. Deficit
spending by the United States allowed excess dollar deposits to ag-
gregate in foreign banks. Two results followed from this aggregation:
first, the United States dollar became the most dominant currency in
the external market and, second, foreign bank activity in the exter-
nal market increased.3 As the volume and velocity of dollar move-
ment between nations increased, the external market correspondingly
grew. The corresponding growth of the external market attracted the
banking industry to the more competitive and less regulated realm of
offshore jurisdictions. a2
26. Id.
27. See supra note I and accompanying text; see also infra note 46-59 and accompany-
ing text.
28. As one commentator suggests, such a thesis is, however, subject to three caveats:
(a) minimal regulation must exist for market confidence; (b) the offshore center must have the
necessary infra-structure; this necessary infra-structure includes: required communications sys-
tems, transportation systems, and administrative support to allow cost-effective operation of a
high volume financial institution transaction center; and (c) transactions with a commercial or
precautionary rationale will not be lured away. Wise at 303; see also Gray and Gray, "The
Multinational Bank: A Financial MNC?" J. OF BANKING AND FINANCE, March 1981, at 48.
The Grays deem this type of minimal regulation "appropriate regulation". Wise and the
Grays, however, do not expand upon this thesis. Consequently, what appears to be appropriate
regulation may in many instances be market control or market protective regulations. Wise at
303.
29. See Miossi, Foreign Banks at Home in'the U.S. 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 33, 34-36
(1980).
30. Blum, Offshore Money Flows, 35 J. OF INT'L AFF. 69, 72 (1981).
31. Wise, supra note 3, at 304. During the period following World War I1 when the
increasing amounts of dollar deposits remained idle, European Banks looked for a mechanism
to achieve a high yield for deposits, and the infusion of eurodollars into external market be-
came the only logical alternative to achieve this objective.
32. Blum, supra note I at 72; see also EINZIG and QUINN, THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM,
6th Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 1-3.
B. Domestic United States Regulatory Factors
The highly-regulated environment of the United States domestic
banking industry has also been a major factor in the growth of off-
shore banking facilities. As Wise noted in his seminal article, "Inter-
national Banking Facilities and the Future of Offshore Banking", 3
two factors motivate banks to participate in the external market: ac-
tive motives,34 and reactive motives.35 Reactive motives are the most
significant.
The desire to escape imposition of monetary regulations by the
Federal Reserve Board is one elemental example of a reactive factor.
To understand why reactive motives arising from domestic regula-
tion pervade the banking industry, the purpose of these regulations
must be considered. Originally, the Federal Reserve Board's Regula-
tion Q (interest rate ceilings) 36 and Regulation D (reserve require-
ments)37 were designed to make the United States domestic banking
industry more profitable. Currently, however, these regulations are
considered burdensom to banks operating under the onerous restric-
tions. The interest rate limits of Regulation Q have reduced the abil-
ity of United States domestic banks to gain access to funds which
were placed in the more economically attractive external market.38
The problem of access to money supplies was compounded by the
reserve requirements of Regulation D, which constricted the amount
of available loan funds and required banks to increase their per unit
cost return requirements on dollars loaned.39 In tandem, these re-
quirements made United States domestic banks uncompetitive with
foreign banks located in the United States and their offshore subsidi-
33. Wise, supra note 3, at 299.
34. Id. at 305. Active motives for entry by a bank into another market tend to be
service and profit oriented. These motives are related directly to the attractiveness of the po-
tential market and not related to the negative aspects of the bank's active domestic market.
35. Reactive motives equate to the previously delineated example of "escape
motivation".
36. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1984) originally prohibited
bank interest payments on deposits with maturity dates of less than thirty days. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.7 (1984), since amended. Furthermore, Regulation Q maintains an interest rate struc-
ture on deposits maturing beyond 30 days as follows:
37. Federal Reserve Board Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1984), Reserve Require-
ments of Depository Institutions, requires a percentage (as designated by the FRB pursuant to
12 C.F.R. § 204.3-4 (1984)) of bank deposits be retained at the depository institution in the
form of non-interest bearing reserves. The rationale of this regulation as delineated in 12
C.F.R. § 204.1(b) is to promote bank liquidity and to facilitate the implementation of mone-
tary policy by the Federal Reserve System.
Originally, Regulation M imposed reserve requirements on funds loaned by parent banks
to foreign branches. Over a period of five years, from 1973-1978, the requirement was phased
out. Currently, however, loans of these funds between parent banks and foreign branches is
regulated by the Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which imposes a
phase in 3 percent reserve requirement.
38. Wise, supra note 3 at 305.
39. Id.
aries which were not subject to extensive regulation.
Additionally, the highly regulated nature of the United States
tax structure operating in conjunction with governmentally spon-
sored social programs of the mid-1960's restricted and thereby re-
duced capital outflow from the United States.40 This restriction of
capital flow manifested itself in the Voluntary Foreign Credit Re-
straint Program, the Interest Equalization Tax, and Sub-part F of
the IRC." Domestic United States banks responded to these domes-
tically imposed tax restrictions by moving offshore and creating
"shell" bank branches. 42 However, despite the termination of official
restrictions in 1974, this growth has continued,4 3 due mainly to do-
mestic bank and foreign bank external market expansion.
III. Niche Fitting Philosophy and Procedures of Offshore
Governments
The rise of the external market coupled with burdensome do-
mestic United States regulations have created an opportune environ-
ment for income seeking nations with proper supporting infra-struc-
tures" to attract financial institution transaction income. The
exercise of this opportunity has manifested itself in a complimentary
regulatory philosophy and a streamlined procedure for establishing
offshore banks. The success of this dual approach is measured by the
phenomenal increase in the number of branches and the number of
dollars transacted in these newly created facilities in recent years.45
A. Regulatory Philosophy
Generally, offshore nations have a regulatory philosophy specifi-
cally developed to encourage the formation of banks within their
countries. This philosophy is illustrated by the host country's benefi-
cial tax structure and an extensive network of treaty concessions."6
Furthermore, the philosophy manifests itself by the adoption of du-
40. Blum, supra note I at 72.
41. The voluntary foreign credit restraint program and the Interest Equalization Tax
had as common provisions a "cost for income reaped from investment abroad." Blum supra
note I, at 72. These programs had as their goal the reduction of dollars invested in high-yield
European and Asian investments. Id. As could be expected from this domestic monetary drain
the U.S. balance of payments problem was aggravated and domestic municipal investment
suffered. Id.
Sub-part F of the Internal Revenue Code, IRC § 951 (1984), delineates the amounts
included in gross income of United States shareholders of foreign corporations. The extensive-
ness of these IRS provisions makes offshore tax havens appear even more attractive.
42. "Shell" used in this manner refers strictly to the "booking" and not transmitting of
funds to the offshore facility. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
43. Blum, supra note I at 72.
44. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note I.
46. C. Thomas Long, Carribean Banking Subsidiaries and the International Banking
Act of 1978, 15 INT'L LAW. 687, 691 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Long].
ally regulated banking systems. Under the dual regulatory system,
banks that operate as "local banks", are subject to extensive and
stringent regulation.47 "Offshore banks", banks neither seeking funds
locally nor making loans locally, are subject to much less regulation
from offshore jurisdictions.4" This regulatory philosophy is embodied
in the Offshore Banking Acts of many jurisdictions which specifically
provide for the creation and maintenance of a dual banking system. 9
The exponential growth of offshore financial institutions and the
tenuous future of offshore facilities has caused a number of Car-
ribean governments to employ screening devices for foreign banks
seeking offshore banking licenses.5" The goal of these screening de-
vices is to maintain a constant flow of transaction income by at-
tracting reputable institutions to the offshore jurisdiction.
As a further incentive for developing offshore banking facilities,
Carribean governments offer strict bank secrecy laws which make it
possible for banks to protect client confidences in a fashion even
more secretive than the renowned "Swiss-bank accounts".51 Further-
more, while direct disclosure requirements require client approval,
many of the offshore jurisdictions have mechanisms to prevent even
indirect disclosure of clients.52 Thus, the regulatory philosophy of
offshore jurisdictions is one of low-taxes, limited regulation and high
confidentiality.
B. Procedure and Requirements for Establishing an Offshore
Banking Facility.
The ease with which an offshore banking facility is founded
complements the business environment of the external market. Be-
yond the formal requirements of a deed of incorporation"a and a cap-
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Barbados Offshore Banking Act § 49 July 26, 1979; see also Long, supra note
46. The Offshore Banking Act of Barbados is a typical offshore jurisdiction statute that pro-
vides a dual regulatory system for domestic and offshore banks.
50. C. Thomas Long, Carribean Banking Subsidiaries and the International Banking
Act of 1978, 15 INT'L LAW. 687, 692 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Long].
51. For example, the Bank Secrecy Act of the Cayman Islands, The Confidential Rela-
tionship (Preservation) Law, carries a penalty of imprisonment for two years, or a fine of
$5,000, or both, for a violation. Further, this Bank Secrecy law provides that in a trial in
which a witness is examined and such examination could lead to the disclosure of confidential
information, the trial must be adjourned so that the witness may receive an instruction from a
judge of the Cayman's highest court, alone and in camera with regard to the giving of the
testimony. Id. at 692-93, n. 26. All of the other offshore jurisdictions have similar, though not
as stringent bank secrecy laws.
52. This prevention of indirect disclosure is exemplified by the court disclosure proceed-
ings of the Cayman Islands' secrecy law previously discussed. Additionally, numerous offshore
jurisdiction have penalties for disclosure of client conferences to the outside public as well as
penalties for disclosure to official inside the domestic government. Id. at 692-93.
53. The requirement of a deed of incorporation is a mere formality. Such deeds are
issued with little or no supervision or examination. H. Beers, An Introduction to the Financial
ital structure mechanism to prohibit total asset withdrawal, 54 few re-
quirements are as important as the approval of the Carribean
jurisdictions' Central Bank.55 Approval is rarely withheld and ap-
pears to be more a means of projecting government transaction in-
come than a barrier to incorporation.
Moreover, offshore jurisdictions provide very lucrative legal
lending limits. These limits are not closely regulated by the Central
Bank or the government, and consequently, encourage the movement
toward the offshore jurisdiction.5" Additionally, the bank reporting
and supervision requirements of these jurisdictions, though currently
subject to a modification effort, are neither extensive nor prohibi-
tive.57 Thus, the relatively simple procedures for establishing offshore
facilities make them attractive for both foreign banks and domestic
United States banks.
IV. The International Banking Act
As previously delineated, the existence and viability of offshore
banking facilities is dependent directly on the United States domes-
tic regulatory environment. Prior to the enactment of the Interna-
tional Bank Act (IBA), 58 foreign banks and their United States do-
mestic market extensions enjoyed a distinct competitive advantage
over United States banks in their penetration and service of the
United States domestic financial market. The IBA sought to elimi-
nate these competitive advantages by terminating operative distinc-
tions between foreign and domestic banks.59 This change in the regu-
latory environment severely altered the ability of foreign banks to
act as conduits for foreign investment. To regain a competitive edge
in the domestic United States financial market and thus, remain an
efficient conduit for foreign investment, foreign banks are realigning
their position vis-a-vis offshore banks. To understand this realign-
ment and the changing role of offshore banks as a conduit for for-
System of the Netherlands Antilles. (Bank of the Netherlands Antilles) p. 44 (1980), as cited
in Long supra note 50 at 693, n. 31.
54. Offshore jurisdictions typically require an "80-20" capital structure, which permits
the shareholders to withdraw practically all of the bank's capital. li does, however, protect the
local government by requiring certain amounts to be retained to meet local expenses. See
Long, supra note 50 at 693.
55. The Central Bank of many offshore jurisdictions provides the supervisory functions
that are in many jurisdiction the responsibility of the domestic government. The Central Bank
evaluates an applicant's reliability, solvency, expertise, structure, and proposed operations as
criteria in the decision to approve an offshore license. Long, supra note 50, at 694.
56. Wise, supra note 3, at 305.
57. Long, supra note 50, at 693-94.
58. PUB. L. No. 95-369, 92 STAT. 1888 [codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 and scat-
tered sections (1978)]; IBA regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204, 217 (1982). These enabling regula-
tions were promulgated on June 23, 1981, and became effective December 3, 1981. See 46
Fed. Reg. 32, 426 (1981).
59. Wise, supra note 3, at 314.
eign banks operating in the United States and foreign bank invest-
ment generally, an examination of the pre-IBA regulatory
environment and post-IBA regulatory environment is essential.
A. The Pre-IBA Era
Historically, the American domestic banking system was predi-
cated upon a dual system of regulation. 0 Nationally chartered banks
were subject to federal regulation, while state banks, unless members
of the Federal Reserve system, were subject only to state regulation.
Foreign banks and their multiform extensions operating in the
United States, on the other hand, were presented with an alternative.
Before the adoption of the IBA, a foreign bank, with the notable
exception of an "Edge Act Corporation","1 could control only one
federally authorized entity.62 This entity was a national bank organ-
ized as a subsidiary of a foreign business entity. 3 On the state level,
however, foreign entities encountered a growing number of state gov-
ernments which permitted and authorized foreign banking entities to
carry on business within their jurisdictions, either in the form of
agencies or branches. 4 Under the dual system of state and federal
licensing and regulation prior to enactment of the IBA, foreign bank
extensions within the United States domestic financial market had
numerous competitive advantages over domestic United States
60. Norton and Whitley, Banking Law Manual § 2.03(3); see National Currency Act
of 1863, 12 STAT. 665 (1863), revised and re-enacted as National Bank Act of 1864, 13 STAT.
99 (1864) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
61. An Edge Act Corporation is a corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in
international or foreign banking or other international or foreign financial operations, or in
banking or other financial operations in a U.S. dependency or possession. Operative require-
ments of an Edge Act corporation have been extensively modified by § 3(a) of the IBA. 12
U.S.C. § 611 (1976). Moreover, many Edge Act corporations, however, are not engaged in
banking but act as holding companies for their parent member bank's interests in foreign
subsidiaries. See 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1976). As provided by statute, Edge Corporations are not
limited to banking activities and also serve as vehicles for investments in non-traditional bank-
ing transactions. See Foorman, Revised Regulation K, 80 UN. ILL. L. FORUM 41 (1980).
62. Long, supra note 50 at 697, see also Foreign Bank Act of 1975: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Congress, 2d. Sess. 26, 29 (1975).
63. Id.
64. Long, supra note 46 at 697-98; see also Gardner, Foreign Investments in U.S.
Banking, in D.C. Bar Manual, Foreign Investment in the U.S. 382-83 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Gardner]. Eleven states, prior to enactment of the IBA, permitted foreign banking
entities to carry on business with their jurisdictions by foreign banks. Of these eleven, seven
states permitted and authorized the use of agencies or branches by foreign banks: Alaska,
ALAS. STAT. §§ 06.06.360, .367, .10.010 to .05 (1978); California, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1750-
1758 and 3500-3543 (Deering 1978); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 16-112 §§ 501-519 (1978);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.CH. 167, §§ 37-45 A (1971); New York, NY BANK-
ING LAW §§ 200-209 (McKinney 1971); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 706.005, 713.010-. 10
(1975); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.04290-300, 30,.42.010 to .900 (1977). For
a historical profile of the use of Foreign Banking in the United States, see Miossi, FOREIGN
BANKS AT HOME IN THE U.S., 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 33 (1980); see also Glidden and Shockey,
U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks: A Comparison of the Federal and State Char-
ter Option, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Glidden and Shockey].
banks.
Primary among the advantages that foreign banks enjoyed over
domestic banks was that foreign branches and agencies were not
subject to the Federal Reserve Board's reserve requirements.6 5 This
permitted foreign entities to fully utilize investment capital. Further-
more, it allowed a direct and totally efficient conduit from external
financial market sources of funds (targeted foreign investment) to
the United States domestic financial market. Consequently, foreign
banks used offshore banking facilities in a limited capacity primarily
for tax savings. The lack of a reserve requirement in and of itself
produced sufficient savings to the foreign banks and insured the at-
tractiveness of their funds offered for investment.66 The utilization of
offshore facilities by foreign banks was, therefore, ancillary in
nature. 7
Another advantage which U. S. domestic market foreign bank
entities enjoyed over domestic U. S. banks was that foreign bank
entities, other than federally authorized subsidiary banks, were free
to establish and operate full-service banking operations and facilities
across state lines. Domestic banks were prohibited from such "inter-
state banking". The McFadden Act of 192768 and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, as amended, 9 specifically prohibit domestic
banking entities from establishing full service banking operations
and facilities in more than one state.7 Prior to the enactment of the
65. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Regulation D).
66. This attractiveness of investment in the United States is exemplified in the U. S.
Domestic Growth of the foreign banking presence. Over the last twenty years, the degree and
scope of these activities has increased dramatically. In 1965, 45 foreign chartered banks re-
ported assets of seven billion dollars from their combined total U. S. operations. Comment,
The Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks and the International Banking Act of 1978, 80
UN. ILL. FOR. 325 (1980). By 1973, the first significant increase in the foreign presence was
noted. Fifteen additional foreign banks started domestic U. S. operations and total U. S. assets
of all foreign banks totalled $37 billion. Id. This incredible growth continued through the
1970's and as of April, 1978, the number of foreign banks with U. S. based banking facilities
and operations had more than doubled the 1973 figures, totalling "122 foreign banks, operat-
ing through 273 various agencies, branches, representative offices and investment companies."
Id. This presence had total U. S. assets of $90 billion. Id. See also, Foreign Banking in the
United States: Economic Policies and Practices: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1966). For an in-depth discussion of the penetration of the United
States domestic market by foreign banks see e.g., D'Arista, The Foreign Bank Invasion, 160
BANKERS MAGAZINE 43 (Autumn 1977); Edwards & Zwick, Activities and Regulatory Is-
sues: Foreign Banks in the United States, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 58 (1975). MacKenzie
& MacKenzie, Penetrator of the United States Market by a Foreign Bank, 6 INT'L. LAW 876
(1972).
67. This conclusion is predicated on the fact that a majority of banks found in tax-
haven jurisdictions are U. S. "shell" branches. See Note, International Banking Facilities, 13
L. & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 997, 1027 (1981).
68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 332 (1976).
69. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976).
70. Skigen and Fitzsimmons, The Impact of the International Banking Act of 1978 on
Foreign Banks and Their Domestic and Foreign Affiliates, 35 Bus. LAW 55, 61 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Skigen and Fitzsimmons].
IBA, foreign banks were not subject to these provisions nor compara-
ble restrictions. Many commentators share the opinion that the abil-
ity of foreign banks to receive deposits, make loans and pay checks
at branches in more than one state, gave foreign banks a competitive
advantage over domestic banks, particularly those foreign banks
which actively competed for domestic commercial and industrial
loan business.
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This advantage attracted foreign investment to the United
States in two ways. First, the interstate banking advantage of foreign
banks permitted efficient movement of external investment funds
throughout the nation to the source of demand. Second, the inter-
state system itself created demand by attracting businesses seeking
low cost, easily transferrable capital. The network aided in the selec-
tion of targets for foreign investment capital. Consequently, foreign
bank interstate banking provided an exceptional conduit for external
funds into selected high-yield domestic United States investments.
An additional advantage enjoyed by foreign bank branches and
agencies was their ability to hold equity interests in securities firms.
Domestic United States banks were prohibited from doing the same
by the Glass-Stegall Act.72 Moreover, state authorized foreign bank
agencies and branches were not subject to federal statutory provi-
sions which precluded United States domestic banks from issuing,
underwriting, selling and distributing securities in the United States,
either in their own capacity or through the use of securities affili-
ates.7" Thus, the foreign entity provided a cost effective and mini-
mally regulated conduit for foreign investment into the domestic
United States securities market. Also, the ability of foreign entities
to underwrite, sell, and distribute securities helped increase the influ-
ence of foreign owners in United States domestic corporations.
Finally, foreign banks operating as a state authorized branch or
agency were not subject to the prohibitions against non-banking ac-
tivities contained in the Bank Holding Company Act. The Federal
Bank Holding Company Act74 provides limitations and restrictions
on the powers of companies which have "control" over any bank or-
ganized in the United States. 75 The most important and most perva-
sive provision of the Act is Section 4(a) which provides that:
71. Farrar, Raiken, Clarke, Choice of Home State Under the International Banking
Act of 1978, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 91, 93-95 (1980); Reigner, A Developmental Perspective on
the International Banking Act of 1978, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 1, 4-5 (1980).
72. CH. 89, 48 STAT. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also
Revised Statutes § 5136; Comment, The Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks and the
International Banking Act of 1978, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 325, 335 (1980).
73. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 STAT. 162 (1933).
74. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976).
75. Gruson and Weld, Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the
United States, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 129, 130 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gruson & Weld].
No bank holding company shall (i) engage in any activities
other than banking or managing or controlling banks or other
exempted subsidiaries, or engage in any nonbanking activities
other than certain exempted activities, (ii) acquire direct or indi-
rect ownership or control of any voting shares of any company
which is not a bank or an otherwise exempted company, or (iii)
retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding
company or an otherwise exempted company.76
Foreign banks, which operated a state authorized branch or agency,
generally fell outside the limitation and restrictions of Section 4(a)
because the foreign banking entity did not "control" a "bank" as
defined in the BHCA.77 Therefore, the foreign banking entity was
not prohibited from conducting non-banking activities in the United
States, except when state law, under which a branch or agency was
licensed and regulated, prohibited or restricted non-banking activi-
ties conducted through a branch or agency itself.
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Prior to the enactment of the IBA, foreign bank entities main-
tained a direct and efficient conduit for investment to the United
States. This conduit manifested itself in the maximization of invest-
ment capital of foreign branches and agencies not subject to reserve
requirements; the efficient and cost effective transportation of funds
to investment demands via interstate banking; the ability to operate
and own securities firms and perform dealer/broker functions in eq-
uity securities; and the ability to enter into non-banking activities
not prohibited foreign banks by the BHCA. The enactment of the
113A dramatically affected this efficient conduit. Consequently, the
ancillary role which offshore banks play in the foreign investment
conduit will significantly change.
B. Impact of the International Banking Act on the Foreign Invest-
ment Conduit
The IBA and the regulations promulgated thereunder79 seek to
restore competitive parity between United States domestic financial
institutions and foreign banking entities conducting business in the
international market.8" Simultaneously, however, the Act maintains
regulatory control over the domestic United States banking indus-
try.81 Thus, although international in scope, the IBA has a profound
76. Id. Section 2(a)(1) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1976).
77. Gruson and Weld, supra note 75 at 130; Section 4(a) BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)
(1976).
78. Gruson and Weld, supra note 75, at 129-30.
79. See supra note 60.
80. Skigen and Fitzsimmons, supra note 70, at 56.
81. Id.
effect on the domestic financial market by placing United States
banks on a level of competitive equality of opportunity with foreign
bank entities operating in the United States domestic financial
market.
The approach of the IBA is characterized as non-discriminatory
and is known euphemistically as a policy of "national treatment".82
Generally, the IBA extends its provisions to foreign bank parents
and their foreign banking extensions operating in the United States.
Thus, for the first time, these foreign bank entities are subject to the
federal supervisory authority of the United States Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (FRB).83
The IBA addresses the four previously discussed areas in which
foreign banks enjoyed a competitive advantage over United States
domestic banks. Previously, foreign branches and foreign agencies
were not subject to Federal Reserve Board requirements.84 Section
7(a) of the "IBA authorizes the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
to impose federal reserve requirements and deposit interest-rate limi-
tations on certain branches and agencies of foreign banks."85 Al-
though the reserve requirement was phased in by the imposition of a
marginal reserve requirement, 86 the effect of the requirement on the
foreign investment conduit is dramatic.
Imposition of the reserve requirement will have two profound
consequences for the foreign investment conduit. First, the reserve
requirement will create a funnel effect from the external market to
the domestic United States financial market, and second, the in-
creased cost of foreign investment capital will reduce demand for
foreign capital. The funnel effect decreases the amount, the liquidity
and the velocity of funds available for foreign investment in the
82. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE
CONG. AND AD. NEWS 1421, 1422. At the core of the national treatment philosophy is the
concept that competing institutions should operate under like regulations regardless of their
national origin and ownership. This concept has two operative elements. The first element
encompasses like regulatory treatment in like circumstances. The second element involves uni-
form treatment of federal and state authorized entities. Id.
83. The U. S. Senate summarized the national treatment philosophy as follows:
The general policy of the United States with regard to foreign enterprises
doing business in the United States has been one of national treatment. Under
this policy foreign enterprises operating in the host company are treated as com-
petitive equals with their domestic counterparts. There is, at this time, no uni-
form national policy concerning foreign banking operation in this country. As a
result, foreign banks enjoy many competitive advantages over our domestic
banks. This bill establishes the principle of parity of treatment between foreign
and domestic banks in like circumstances. Id.
84. Patrikis, Marginal Reserve Requirement on Branches and Agencies of Foreign
Banks, 80 UN. OF ILL. L. FOR. 111 (1980).
85. Id.
86. Id. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1976). See also the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, PUB. L. No. 96-221 § 103, 94 STAT. 133 (1980).
United States domestic financial market by constricting the flow of
readily available external market funds. Furthermore, the reserve re-
quirement reduces the amount of funds that a foreign banking entity
can invest in the United States domestic market at a cost-effective
advantage over United States domestic banks. Consequently, al-
though the demand for overall investment capital remains unaf-
fected, the ability of foreign banks to offer cost-effective capital will
decrease. Therefore, the demand for foreign investment capital will
decrease. As will be discussed subsequently, the use of offshore bank-
ing facilities by foreign banking entities for foreign capital invest-
ment in the United States, provides a means for foreign banks to
again provide cost-effective foreign investment capital to the United
States domestic market.
Prior to enactment of IBA, a foreign bank with no federally
authorized banking subsidiary could maintain full service branches
in an interstate capacity in any jurisdiction that permitted their en-
try.87 Under the IBA, a foreign bank's ability to enter a particular
state jurisdiction is a question reserved to the state in which the for-
eign banking activity is desired. A foreign bank that has or desires
banking operations and/or facilities across state borders must, pur-
suant to IBA Section 5, select a "home state".88 With certain excep-
tions, specifically provided in the Act, the IBA applies the limitations
of the depository restrictions applicable to Edge Act corporations to
the foreign bank's presence outside the "home state".89
Thus, the IBA's attempt to make United States banks more
competitive in the international financial market has the direct effect
of limiting the service mechanism of a foreign bank's domestic
United States branches and agencies. Furthermore, the increase in
activity of domestic United States Edge Act corporations makes
competition for external market funds greater, thereby decreasing
87. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
88. Glidden and Shockey, supra note 64 at 65-66; Skigen and Fitzsimmons,supra note
70 at 62.
89. Under the Edge Act, as revised by the IBA:
the deposits which may be accepted by an Act corporation, and which
would therefore be permissible deposits for a federal or state branch located
outside a foreign bank's home state, are deposits which are derived from sources
or are related to international banking and finance. These deposits consist of:
"demand and time (but not savings) deposits which are made by (1) foreign
governments, persons conducting business principally at their offices abroad and
individuals resident abroad, and (2) any other person if the deposits (i) are to be
transmitted abroad, (ii) are to provide collateral or payment for extensions of
credit by the branch, (iii) represent proceeds of collection abroad which are to
be used to pay goods exported or imported or for other direct costs of export or
import, or which are to be periodically transferred to the depositor's account at
another financial institution, or (iv) represent proceeds of extensions of credit by
the branch." Skigen and Fitzsimmons, supra note 67 at 62.
Specifically provided exceptions include grandfathered offices which pre-date the IBA. Glidden
and Shockey, supra note 61 at 66.
the availability of low cost foreign investment funds. Consequently,
the attractiveness of foreign investment capital in the United States
domestic financial market, both in terms of availability and costs, is
severely undermined by this provision of the IBA.
The IBA also affects the ability of foreign bank branches to
hold equity interests in securities firms, something which United
States banks were barred from doing by the Glass-Stegall Act.9" The
IBA retains the original prohibitions of securities activities, limited,
however, by an exemption for certain foreign bank interests in
United States securities companies."1 This provision permits a
grandfathered securities firm 92 to make fundamental corporate
changes, such as expansion, mergers, or diversification, despite IBA
requirements which would otherwise forbid such a change.93 To be
eligible for the exemptions provided in this provision, a foreign bank
must not increase its ownership percentage in a securities affiliate
beyond twenty-five percent.94 Furthermore, the FRB will disallow
any fundamental corporate change if a foreign bank owns more than
25 percent of the securities affiliate.95
Thus, this provision of the IBA severely limits foreign invest-
ment via equity securities. The limitation is not total. The provision
appears more a means of limiting the influence of foreign investors
than a means of preventing the infusion of foreign capital. One may
only speculate that where the foreign investor's influence is limited,
the incentive to invest in equity securities is curtailed.9"
Prior to the enactment of the IBA, a foreign branch or agency
was not a "bank" for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA).9 7 As a result a foreign bank was permitted to engage in de
facto interstate banking and to expand into non-banking activities.
These advantages have been eliminated by specific provisions of
the IBA. IBA Section 5 restricts foreign banks from using domestic
subsidiaries to engage in interstate banking by applying the limita-
tions of Section 3(d) of the BHCA to foreign banks operating in the
U. S. domestic financial market.98 Section 3(d) of the BHCA pro-
90. Id. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91. Note, The Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks and the International Banking
Act of 1978, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 325, 353-354 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note - Nonbank-
ing Activities].
92. Id.; S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1435-36. See also, Note, Nonbanking Activities supra note 91
at 354.
93. Note - Nonbanking Activities supra note 91 at 354.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. A foreign investor's influence is measured by its ability to own securities firms and
issue, underwrite and deal in securities.
97. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
98. Skigen and Fitzsimmons, supra note 70 at 63.
vides that:
No bank holding company or subsidiary thereof may ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of interest in, or
substantially all of the assets of any bank outside the state in
which the operations of the holding company's banking subsidi-
aries are principally conducted unless the acquisition of such
shares or assets of a state bank by an out-of-state bank holding
company is specifically authorized by the laws of the state in
which the bank is located. 9
Accordingly, the IBA provides that a foreign bank is considered to
be a bank holding company, "the operations of whose banking sub-
sidiaries are principally conducted in the foreign bank's home
state" 10 by reference to the BHCA restrictions. Therefore, a foreign
bank may not engage in de facto interstate banking in a state other
than its home state unless the laws of the state in which it hopes to
establish a branch, merge or acquire a branch specifically allow it to
do so. 101 Because a majority of states do not allow foreign-state
banks or bank holding companies to conduct business within their
jurisdictions, there are only limited opportunities for a foreign bank
subsidiary located outside a foreign bank's home state to conduct
depository transactions.102
As a further restriction on foreign banks, IBA Section 8, ex-
tends the BHCA's limitations of nonbanking activities to "foreign
banks maintaining branches, agencies or commercial lending compa-
nies in the United States." ' This section removes the restriction
placed on the federal government to regulate only foreign banks with
separately chartered federal subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the Act
grandfathers existing activities of foreign bank entities.104 The Act
permits the FRB to stop an activity if it finds that "termination is
necessary to prevent undue concentration of resources, decreased or
unfair competition, conflicts of interest or unsound banking practices
in the United States."10 Therefore, many of the competitive advan-
tages enjoyed by foreign branches and agencies under the BHCA
were nullified. Furthermore, Section 8 prevents future growth of ser-
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vestment conduit mechanism.
Consequently, each of the previously enumerated competitive
advantages existing prior to enactment of the IBA have been elimi-
nated or reduced by the Act. Thus, the foreign investment conduit
was severely constricted by the IBA provisions and the consequent
loss by foreign bank entities of their competitive advantage vis-a-vis
United States domestic banks.
V. The Offshore Conduit Mechanism
The elimination of the major advantages which foreign banks
enjoyed over domestic United States banks by the IBA severely con-
stricted the foreign investment conduit. Still, United States domestic
demand for foreign investment continues.106 Consequently, foreign
banks seek an alternative means to regain the competitive edge over
United States domestic banks in the United States domestic
financial market and thereby reopen the foreign investment conduit.
The competitive edge can be regained through the use of a tax-ad-
vantageous offshore subsidiary of a foreign bank.
A. Taxation of Foreign Bank Entities within the United States
Foreign bank entities operating in the United States are taxed
like domestic United States banks, which, like other corporations,
pay income tax at the corporate level.107 Generally, a bank's gross
income constitutes income from whatever source derived, and in-
cludes stated interest, points, prepayment penalties, original issue
discount on debt instruments, dividends and gains from property
transactions. 108 Moreover, foreign bank entities operating in the
United States domestic market are permitted the usual deductions
extended to United States domestic banks and corporations. '09 Addi-
tional deductions specifically allowed financial institutions are deline-
106. Munsell and Field, Foreign Acquisitions of U. S. Banks and the Principles of U. S.
Banking Law, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 163 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Munsell & Field]; Bel-
langer, The Future of Foreign Banking in the United States, 80 UN. ILL. L. FOR. 21 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Bellanger].
107. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, § 581. Section 581 provides as
follows:
the term "bank" means a bank or trust company incorporated and doing busi-
ness under the laws of the United States or of any state, a substantial part of the
business of which consists of receiving deposits and making loans and discounts,
or of exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks
under authority of the Comptroller of the Currency, and which is subject by law
to supervision and examination by State, or Federal authority having supervision
over banking institutions. Such term also means a domestic building and loan
association.
[hereinafter cited IRC § 581]. See generally 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (1984).
108. NORTON AND WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL (New York: Matthew Bender,
1984) at § 14.04[l].
109. Id. at § 14.05[l].
ated throughout the Internal Revenue Code.'1" No deduction is al-
lowed or permitted for a dividend received by a stockholder. For
example, the foreign parent, must be included in gross income."'
For federal income tax purposes, a "dividend" is any distribution
made by a corporation to its shareholders, out of the corporation's
current or accumulated earnings and profits." 2 A distribution is
characterized as a dividend if the corporation has sufficient earnings
and profits for the taxable year, even if it has accumulated a defi-
cit. 13 The dividend-distribution rules apply only to a foreign entity
parent in its capacity as shareholder, not as a creditor." 4 The capac-
ity of the taxpayer may effect the tax treatment of the dividend, i.e.,
a creditor-foreign parent would be entitled to capital gains treatment
and not ordinary income treatment of a dividend.""
This distinguishing feature is paramount because of the appar-
ent high income tax bracket of these entities and the resultant exten-
sive taxation of the money-profit refund to the foreign parent. Conse-
quently, the development of a tax strategy by foreign banking
entities conducting business within the United States domestic
financial market is a fundamental element in reassertion of a com-
petitive advantage by these banks." 6
B. Foreign Bank Movement toward Offshore Facilities
With the elimination by the IBA of the advantages enjoyed by
foreign banking entities in the United States, the cost of foreign in-
vestment funds has increased, while the attractiveness of these funds
has decreased. Therefore, the need for U.S. domestic banks to go
offshore in order to enter the external market sources of foreign capi-
tal has been reduced. This will create a transaction income void in
active financial centers of offshore jurisdictions."17 Subsidiaries of
foreign banks will fill this void and become an intermediary between
110. Deductions are available for interest paid or accrued during the taxable year, IRC
§ 163(a) (1984), for certain types of taxes paid or accrued, IRC § 164 (1984), and for the
depreciation of an asset over a period of time, IRC § 162 (1984). A bond premium may be
amortized to yield current deductions or to reduce the basis of the bonds, 1RC § 168. If the
allowable deductions exceed its annual gross income, a banking institution suffers a net operat-
ing loss that may be carried back or forward, IRC § 171(c) (1984). Bad debts may be de-
ducted under the charge-off method or the reserve method, IRC § 172 (1984). If a bad debt is
evidenced by a security, a banking institution may take an ordinary loss deduction, IRC §
172(b) (1984).
I11. IRC § 61(a)(7) (1984).
112. TRC§§ 301 and 316(a) (1984). Every distribution is deemed to be made from
earnings and profits o the extent the corporation has earnings and profits, Id.
113. Id.
114. NORTON AND WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL (New York: Matthew Bender,
1984) at § 14.04[1] [hereinafter cited as Norton and Whitley].
115. Id.
116. Wise, supra note 3, at 323-24.
117. Wise, supra note 3, at 323-24.
the foreign-home bank source of Eurodollars and the United States
foreign entity investment initiator. This will occur for two reasons.
First, certain transactions require lending services which exceed per-
missible United States regulatory lending limits.' 18 Second the tax
advantages presented by offshore jurisdictions allow the infusion of
low-cost foreign investment capital to the United States foreign
banking entity. This restores the attractiveness of foreign investment
capital (primarily in the form of debt securities) to the United States
domestic financial market." 9
Federal Reserve Board regulations impose legal lending limits
on banking institutions. 20 A market exists, however, which due to
the nature of the investment or investor, requires a higher rate of
interest than allowed under these regulations. 2' To match those in
need of capital with the external supply of Eurodollars, foreign bank-
ing entities in the United States will perform a correspondence func-
tion by "setting up" these transactions in offshore jurisdictions. Al-
though tax advantages exist, the true purpose of the offshore
subsidiary transaction is to avoid United States domestic regulations.
C. The Conduit Paradigm
The advantageous tax attributes of offshore facilities are the
primary reason for foreign bank utilization of offshore financial in-
termediaries. This utilization will manifest itself in two forms.
First, the primary objective of foreign bank utilization of off-
shore facilities is to decrease the amount of taxable income of the
foreign banking entity located in the United States. To escape taxa-
tion in their home jurisdiction, a foreign bank will "transmit" or
send capital earmarked for foreign investment in the United States
to an offshore facility that minimally taxes the transaction and does
not tax the holding of the money in its jurisdiction.' 22 The foreign
banking entity in the United States maintains all regulatory require-
ments, locates the source of demand for investment, and performs a
correspondence function by having funds loaned from the foreign
parent's offshore facility directly to the customer. Consequently, the
situs of the transaction is the offshore bank. The funds, once trans-
acted, are transmitted to the correspondent foreign subsidiary in the
United States and delivered to the investment source.
This paradigm is advantageous to foreign entities located in the
118. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. These investors include those that due to their "background" cannot procure
financing from conservation and collateral oriented domestic U. S. financial institutions. These
investments include those with a higher than normal risk factor.
122. Blum, supra note 1, at 71-74.
United States for numerous reasons. First, the interest income,
which is taxable under IRC § 61, is attributable to the offshore sub-
sidiary, and therefore, not taxable to the United States located en-
tity. 123 The onshore entity performs a mere conduit function, no
money is loaned or received, beyond transaction costs. Consequently,
as long as the offshore bank transacts United States domestic busi-
ness and maintains proper regulatory requirements, no additional
taxable income is received by the onshore entity. Second, the trans-
action costs of the correspondence function are deductible from the
onshore entity's gross income. This reduces taxable net income of the
foreign entity operating in the United States while reducing overall
foreign bank tax liability.12 ' Moreover, it reduces the required rate
of return on other domestically loaned capital, 25 thereby increasing
foreign investment by lowering the cost and thus the required rate of
return deemed profitable of loanable funds.
The third major reason that the intermediary paradigm is ad-
vantageous is that by having an offshore bank with its low holding
cost make the capital contribution, the overall cost to the parent for-
eign bank is reduced. 26 The capital invested by the offshore entity in
the land based foreign entity when returned through earnings and
profits will be characterized as a return on capital and, therefore,
subject only to a capital gains tax rate (as opposed to an ordinary
income tax rate). The ultimate effect of these mechanisms is to re-
duce the external rate of return requirements on foreign banking en-
tities operating in the United States domestic financial market,
thereby reducing the cost of their funds. Consequently this money
increasingly attracts investment and the efficient flow of foreign in-
vestment to the United States is reestablished.
This conduit provides a mechanism to dilate the constricted for-
eign investment conduit. The effectiveness of the intermediary func-
tion of offshore banks must be measured against regulatory problems
imposed by the IBA and the expanding jurisdiction of United States
courts over offshore accounts.
VI. Problems in Using Offshore Banking Facilities as a Conduit for
Foreign Investment
A. Inherent and Immediate Problems
The conduit mechanism is not without inherent and immediate
problems. The IRS may penetrate the three-step, offshore intermedi-
123. See generally, IRC § 61 (1984).
124. See generally, Norton & Whitley, supra note 109 at § 14.02.
125. Norton and Whitley, BANKING LAW MANUAL, § 14.00, et seq.
126. Id.
ary mechanism with the "step-transaction doctrine.12 7 This seems
unlikely, however, because of the formidable bank secrecy laws of
offshore jurisdiction. These laws prohibit the names and sources of
client-funds from being divulged. Second, numerous provisions of the
IRC contain language prohibiting such transactions if the sole pur-
pose is to evade or avoid an income tax.'28 Therefore, an underlying
business rationale, sufficient to overcome the burden of proof im-
posed upon the IRS, must accompany each transaction. 12 9
B. Regulatory Problems Imposed by the IBA
Faced with the loss of competitive advantage in the United
States domestic financial market caused by the IBA, foreign banks
can utilize offshore banking facilities to reassert their competitive
advantage. The revitalization of foreign bank advantages in the
United States domestic market causes a dilation of the IBA con-
stricted foreign investment conduit. Three major regulatory
problems, identified by C. Thomas Long in his seminal work, "Car-
ribean Banking Subsidiaries and the International Banking Act of
1978",13° will be encountered by foreign banks in their attempt to
use an offshore banking subsidiary to enter the United States domes-
tic financial market. These three problems are:
1) the requirement of IBA §4(a) that a foreign bank must
be engaged "directly in a banking business outside the United
States" before it can be licensed under the Act;
2) the scope and degree of examination and supervision ac-
corded offshore banks by offshore governments and the FRB at-
titude toward such; and
3) the conflict between United States Treasury Department
reporting requirements and the foreign jurisdiction bank secrecy
laws. 1 '
The requirement of IBA §4(a) that a foreign bank must be "en-
gaged directly" in banking business outside the United States poses
the greatest potential problem. The Federal Reserve Board has
adopted a limited interpretation of the "directly engaged" require-
ment contained in IBA §4(a).' 32 The requirement was added to the
127. See Kimball-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commr., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affd per curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951) cert. den. 342 U.S. 824 (1951). The Kimball case has been
applied in numerous cases in which a multiple step transaction, though each step technically
complies with the intent of the law, does not comport with the intent of the tax law.
128. For example, see IRC § 357(b)(I)(A)-(B) (1984).
129. An equivalent business rationale will not overcome the requirements and the bur-
den of proof elements in income tax evasion or income tax avoidance cases. The rationale must
be well documented, and i.e., the inability to procure equivalent rates at other institutions.
130. C. Thomas Long, Carribean Banking Subsidiaries and the International Banking
Act of 1978, 15 INT'L LAW. 687 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Long].
131. Id. at 704-05.
132. Id.
Act at the request of the FRB.' 33 Thus, the language of §4(a)
smacks of FRB protectionism. In determining whether a bank meets
these requirements, the size, banking experience and reputation of a
foreign parent are not determinative.'" More important, the offshore
banking subsidiary must comply with the literal requirements of the
provision.
Although the originally proposed IBA, H.R. 7325, did not in-
clude the "engaged directly" language, the FRB felt that such lan-
guage was an imperative, considering the originally proposed defini-
tion of a "foreign bank" contained in the Act.' 35 When originally
proposed, the definition of foreign bank did not include what the
FRB deemed "Carribean shell banks". 36 Though the "engaged di-
rectly" language was added to the Act, elaborations upon the term
"foreign bank" were left to administrative enforcement agencies to
devise as needed to carry out the IBA.1
7
The FRB's attempt to amend the IBA to include the "engaged
directly" language and the FRB policy to allow future elaborations
on the definition of a "foreign bank" stand as policy contradictions.
One author, noting this discrepancy, concludes that the apparent dis-
crepancy produces a view of Section 4(a) that permits "the estab-
lishment of a Carribean banking subsidiary for the sole purpose of
carrying on activities in the United States under the Act so long as
the foreign parent shareholder of the Carribean subsidiary is a suffi-
ciently viable and responsible institution willing to guarantee the ob-
ligations" of its offshore subsidiary.138 Furthermore, as Long con-
cludes that by viewing an applicant offshore-subsidiary bank in a
consolidated fashion, the interest of foreign investors is sustained
without deterring many risk oriented capital venturists. a9 Therefore,
as long as the foreign banking entity operating within the United
States domestic financial market is an extension of an offshore bank-
ing facility backed and supported by a viable foreign financial insti-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The definition of "foreign bank" contained in H.R. 7325, as originally proposed,
provided as follows:
"Foreign bank" means any institution that (I) organized under the laws of a
foreign country, a territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, or the Virgin Island and (2) either (a) principally conducts its banking
business outside the United States or (b) is a subsidiary, as that ter~n is defined
in the Banking Holding Act of 1956, of any institution which, on a consolidated
basis, principally conducts its banking business outside the United States.
H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)(7) (1977), as cited by Long, supra note 46, at 705.
Consequently, the FRB took the position that this definition of a "foreign bank" was overly
limited.




tution, the requirements of the §4(a) of the IBA are met.
Another problem that is encountered in a foreign bank's use of
offshore subsidiary's activities by foreign governments. Such indiffer-
ence is contrary to international and United States policy.14 Super-
vision and examination by offshore governments is imperative, con-
sidering the protection afforded accounts in an offshore bank. The
lack of supervision may weigh heavily in the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's decision to extend an IBA license to an offshore subsidiary of
a foreign bank.141
The final problem identified by Long is the classic confrontation
between elements that form the cores of offshore banking and
United States domestic banking. The confrontation involves the bank
secrecy laws of offshore banks and the periodic reporting require-
ments of the FRB. 42 Although the FRB has assured foreign banks
that the information divulged in compliance with the reporting re-
quirements is exempted from the disclosure provisions of the Free-
dom of Information Act, 43 to date no further assurances have been
provided for offshore accounts. Consequently, to meet the reporting
requirements of the FRB, substantial amounts of information need
to be divulged contrary to the laws of offshore jurisdictions. One au-
thor suggests' that offshore jurisdictions take the next step and per-
mit a waiver of their bank secrecy laws. 45 But this does not seem
practicable for independent offshore banks.'4 A waiver appears
more probable for foreign banks using offshore subsidiaries as a con-
duit for viable foreign investment because as external market trans-
action income increases the need for client based secrecy laws de-
creases or becomes expendable.
14 7
140. Id. at 706.
141. Id.
142. Board policy on the reporting requirements states the following:
These proposals are designed, first of all, to provide adequate disclosure on
the financial operations of the foreign bank, on a world-wide basis. This informa-
tion will enable the Board to analyze the parent organization's ability to be a
continuing source of strength to the banking operations being conducted in the
United States. Second, they are intended to provide early indications of possible
abuse of United States banking operations by a weak of trouble foreign bank.
Third, the reporting requirements have been formulated to provide information
on the United States nonbanking activities of foreign banks to determine compli-
ance with the applicable nonbanking prohibitions of the Bank Holding Company
Act.
The International Banking Act of 1978, U.S. FED. RES. BD. REP. 27 (Sept. 17, 1980). As
cited in Long, supra note 46, at 707.
143. See Long, supra note 46, at 707.
144. Long, supra note 46, at 707.
145. Id.
146. Id. Independent banks in many cases rely heavily on the transaction income of
accounts requiring secrecy of the account owners. Blum, supra note I at 72.
147. As the transaction income of the offshore facilities become motivated more by in-
dustry regulatory and maco-economic factors, the need for account secrecy will consequently
decline because the need to attract secrecy oriented depositors will decrease.
C. The Problem of Expanding United States Court Jurisdiction
Until recently, deposits carried on the books of an offshore bank
were outside the jurisdiction of United States courts. This conclusion
was tested in MDA Inc. v. Braga.48 In Braga, Judge Griesa of the
Southern District of New York held that a temporary restraining
order in aid of an attachment could enjoin the transfer of funds held
in an account carried on the books of an offshore bank in Grand
Cayman.' 49 Furthermore, the Court ordered the transfer and deposit
of funds carried on the books of an offshore banking facility located
in Panama into an account under the control of the Clerk of Court
of the Southern District of New York. 5 ' These orders and their ac-
companying rationale have extensive ramifications in the field of in-
ternational banking.
Prior to the Braga decision, it was "taken for granted", without
legal precedent, that an offshore bank was a "separate entity", ex-
isting outside the territorial jurisdiction of United States Courts."'
However, Braga delineates, that the offshore banking facility is a
"shell and has no separate existence. Therefore, it is not a "separate
entity" in any legal sense. Under this rationale the offshore banking
facility may "no longer be treated as one for purposes of jurisdiction
and attachment.
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The key to the underlying thesis of the Braga decision is the
location of the funds and the ability of the depositor to exploit the
"onshore banks" correspondence function. One author concludes 53
that if the offshore funds are maintained in and invested from the
United States and if a depositor can do business with the offshore
bank through its correspondence branch onshore (thus, demonstrat-
ing a lack of separate identity and separate purpose of each of the
banks involved), "then those funds may be subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States courts."' 54 Predicated on Braga and a develop-
ing line of analagous case law, 5 5 use of offshore subsidiaries by for-
148. 81 Civ. 4452 (1982).
149. Id. as delineated in Gross, Offshore Banks: Are They Free From U. S. Court Juris-
diction?, NAT'L. L.J. Feb. 15, 1982, at 26-27 [hereinafter cited as Gross].





155. See, Vislipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81-7052 (2d Cir. 1981); An-
derson v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 241 F.322 (2d Cir. 1917); Meason v. Bank of Miami,
652 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. den. 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 81 Civ. 1836 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981); ABKCO
Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y. 2d 670, 673, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 511, 512 (1976);
Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), affid 223 A.D.
754, 227 N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928); Van Der Veen v. Amsterdam-
sche Bank, 178 Misc. 668, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Ackert v. Ausman, 29 Misc. 2d 962, 218 N.Y.S. 2d
eign banks will subject transacted funds to United States court
jurisdictions.
A foreign bank will be subject to United States court jurisdic-
tion, due to its IBA presence within the United States. The funds of
these banks when "sent" to an offshore subsidiary for a tax advanta-
geous transaction, will subsequently become subject to United States
court jurisdiction if the transaction does not involve the actual trans-
fer of funds to the situs of the transaction. Fundamental to this con-
cept is the notion that the quantifiable and identifiable funds them-
selves become subject to United States jurisdiction.
Although Braga may be limited to cases where the funds are
not transported from a United States domestic depository institution
situs, the underlying rationale of the court does not appear to be so
limited. Consequently, Braga, bolstered by analagous case law,
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could be the basis for the Internal Revenue Service to obtain juris-
diction over funds "transferred" to an offshore subsidiary, when the
funds were used within the United States Court's jurisdiction in vio-
lation of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations. If the IRS
applies this reasoning to offshore subsidiaries it may severely under-
mine the effect and use of offshore subsidiaries of foreign banks as a
conduit for foreign investment in the United States by eliminating
the tax advantages of the subsidiaries. Consequently, the foreign in-
vestment conduit may constrict due to the lack of cost effective for-
eign investment capital, and the subsequent elimination of the for-
eign bank's competitive advantage vis-a-vis domestic United States
banks.
VII. Conclusion - Projections
Many commentators predict that establishment of international
banking facilities in the United States will have a profound negative
affect on offshore banking. 157 One author suggests that offshore
financial transactions will decrease from eleven percent (11%) to
merely two percent (2%) of the overall market.158 However, the au-
thor and those supporting him fail to consider the consequent effect
of the IBA on foreign banks in the United States. For foreign banks
to maintain their competitive advantage within the United States do-
mestic market, they must establish a symbiotic relationship with off-
shore facilities. Therefore, any loss of United States domestic bank
822 (Sup. Ct. 1961), affid 20 A.D. 2d 850, 247 N.Y.S. 2d 999 (1964).
156. Id.; see Gross, supra note 149, at 26.
157. For a cataloging of these commentators, see Comment, International Banking Fa-
cilities, N. CAR. J. OF INT'L. L. AND COM. REG. 59, 63 (1982), nn. 7-9.
158. David F. V. Ashby, as quoted by Robert A. Bennett, "America's Debut in Offshore
Banking", THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 November 1981, p. F. 25, as cited in Wise, supra note
3, at 324.
branch transaction income by offshore jurisdictions will be offset by
an increase in the transaction income derived from foreign bank util-
ization of offshore facilities.
Furthermore, not only will the net immediate effect of the IBA
on offshore facilities by negligible, the long-term projections for
growth of the offshore industry remain positive. Once foreign banks
utilize offshore facilities to gain an edge on United States domestic
banks operating under the IBA, United States domestic banks will
examine the use of offshore facilities in conjunction with IBA facili-
ties. Consequently, offshore transactions will expand in the long run.
Until this occurs, foreign banks that utilize offshore facilities as a
financial intermediary will enjoy an efficient conduit for foreign in-
vestment, and a competitive advantage over domestic United States
financial institutions in the United States domestic financial market.
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